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INTERNATIONAL TRADE-POSSIBLE UNDERMINING OF
U.S. PESTICIDE AND FOOD SAFETY LAWS BY THE
DRAFT TEXT OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF GATT
NEGOTIATIONS
I. FACTS
Uruguay Round negotiations for the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) began in 1986. A major item on the agenda for
these negotiations was solving the agricultural trade problems which
had developed during the 1970s and early 1980s.1 The Uruguay Round
negotiations failed to meet the anticipated completion deadline of
December 15, 1990 because of the European Community's refusal to
concede on agricultural subsidy issues.2 On December 20, 1991, a
proposed draft text of the negotiations for the GATT (Dunkel Draft)
was published by GATT Director General Arthur Dunkel in an at-
tempt to resolve these and other troubling issues of the Uruguay
Round.'
A major focus of the Dunkel Draft is sanitary and phytosanitary
standards, 4 pesticide standards, and other food safety issues., The
draft includes plans for harmonization of standards concerning con-
tamination, processing, inspections, packaging, labeling, and other
standards for food, food products, and beverages, as well as pesticides
and plant and animal diseases. 6 According to consumer groups such
Lyn MacNabb & Robert Weaver, Comment, The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT): Has Agriculture Doomed the Uruguay Round?, 26 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 761, 767 (1991). See infra notes 37 & 39.
Id. at 762-63.
GA TT Language Would Undermine FIFRA, Other Environmental Laws, Groups
Say, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 62 (Jan. 8, 1992) [hereinafter GATT
Language].
4 Sanitary or phytosanitary measures are defined in Draft Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc.
MTN.TNC/W/FA, Text on Agriculture, Annex A, at L.45 (Dec. 20, 1991) (available
upon request from the Office of the United States Trade Representative) [hereinafter
Dunkel Draft]. In general, they are measures which protect animal or plant life or
health from risks of disease and pests.
GATT Language, supra note 3, at 62.
6 GA TT Language Would Undermine FIFRA, Other Environmental Laws, Groups
Say, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Jan. 10, 1992) [hereinafter GATT Language Would
Undermine FIFRA].
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as the Community Nutrition Institute and Public Citizen, the draft
agreement restricts assertions of sovereignty by individual nations
wishing to establish their own regulatory systems. The draft advocates
adherence to international standards unless individual nations meet
a narrow exception for demonstrated impending national injury.7
Public Citizen contends that the draft's emphasis on harmonization
of standards will promote less stringent national standards, as nations
will only be required to meet the GATT standards.' The draft also
requires that nations defending their sanitary laws must show that
their standards are the least trade restrictive alternative. 9 The United
States' agreement to this section of the Dunkel Draft may undermine
the high standards of United States food safety laws such as the
Delaney Clause of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FFDCA)10 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA).I1
According to U.S. Trade Representative Carla A. Hills, the United
States does not plan to attempt to delay concluding the Uruguay
Round, despite the United States' failure to issue an official response
to the Dunkel Draft by the January 13, 1992 deadline. 12 Hills says
that the agreement will not be presented to Congress until the draft
is revised to facilitate U.S. objectives of greater exports and more
jobs. 3 A spokesman for Ms. Hills stated that the United States will
not allow federal food safety standards to be undermined by the
GATT.' 4 On November 21, representative Henry Waxman 5 intro-
duced a concurrent resolution which would require Congress to deny
approval to implementing legislation for any trade agreement that
jeopardizes health, safety, or environmental laws. 16
7 Id. The Draft provides: "However, where urgent problems of health protection
arise or threaten to arise for a contracting party, that contracting party may omit
such of the steps enumerated . . . as it finds necessary .... " Dunkel Draft, supra
note 4, at L.49, para. 3.2.
,Id.
9Id.
,o 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1988). For text, see infra note 17 [hereinafter FFDCA].
1 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988) [hereinafter FIFRA]; GA TTLanguage Would Undermine
FIFRA, supra note 6.
2" USTR Hills Calls Uruguay Round 'Right on Track' but Sees No End, Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 138 (Jan. 22, 1992).
13 Id.
14 GATT Language Would Undermine FIFRA, supra note 6.
11 Representative Waxman is a Democrat from California.
16 H.R. Con. Res. 246, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); GATT Language, supra
note 3, at 62. FIFRA and FFDCA are among the laws protected by the resolution.
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II. LAW
A. FFDCA Delaney Clause and FIFRA
One domestic statute that environmental groups fear will be ad-
versely effected by acceptance of the Dunkel Draft is the Delaney
Clause of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 17 The clause
was originally enacted in 1958 in response to public fears of carcin-
ogenic substances in processed foods. The Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) has generally interpreted the clause as requiring strict
intolerance of any additive found to be cancer-causing by valid sci-
entific tests, regardless of the amount of the additive contained in
the final food product. The clause represents a public policy which
places protection of public health above economic benefit consider-
ations."1
Agency officials and the judiciary disagree as to how strictly the
Delaney Clause should be construed. For example, in 1986 the FDA
gave its approval to list two colors as acceptable for use in cosmetics,
even though they had been found to be cancer-causing.' 9 In doing
so the FDA recognized a de minimis exception to the Delaney Clause.
The FDA concluded that it had the "inherent authority" to disregard
the "literal terms of the statute" when the matter was trivial. 20 In
Public Citizen v. Young,2' the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals over-
turned the FDA's approval of the color additives, reasoning that the
de minimis exception conflicted with "the natural, almost inescap-
able" wording of the clause in the statute.22 The court relied on the
legislative history of the FFDCA which showed that Congress adopted
11 Congress' original intent was to preclude approval of any additive which caused
cancer. The clause reads "no additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to
induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which
are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer
in man or animal . . . ." 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A). See also Margaret Gilhooley,
Plain Meaning, Absurd Results and the Legislative Purpose: The Interpretation of
the Delaney Clause, 40 ADmN. L. REv. 267, 270 (1988).
19 Gilhooley, supra note 17, at 273.
,9 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(5)(B) (1988), dealing with color additives, and 21 U.S.C.
§ 360b(d)(1)(H) (1988), dealing with drugs for food-producing animals, include
comparable language to that in § 348(c)(3)(A). All three clauses are referred to as
Delaney Clauses because of their similar wording. Gilhooley, supra note 17, at n.1.
20 Gilhooley, supra note 17, at 274 (quoting Listing of D&C Orange No. 17 and
Red No. 19, 51 Fed. Reg. 28, 331, 346 (1986)).
21 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
22 Id. at 1112.
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the clause as worded despite objections from the food industry that
it was too rigid. 2 Although the FDA argued that statutes may be
read as having implicit exceptions, the court rejected the applicability
of this de minimis theory to the clause because of the absence of a
textual basis for it.24
The FDA continues to urge that it is unreasonable to regulate trivial
risks of contamination in light of the purpose of the legislation. With
improvements in detection methods, it becomes increasingly more
probable that many food additives will be found to be carcinogenic
if fully tested. If the clause is strictly construed, trace amounts of
these additives will cause products to be banned even though they
pose a negligible risk of cancer for the individual who ingests them-
a risk which most consumers would be willing to take. In response
to this problem, Professor Gilhooley suggests that a consistent choice
be made between giving the Delaney Clause an absolute meaning and
interpreting it so as to overlook minute risks that are insignificant
to safety considerations. 25 The FDA's de minimis theory would sat-
isfactorily comply with the intent of Congress if such intent was
interpreted as being to guard against significant rather than negligible
risks.
In February of 1991, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
acting on objections to its response to a petition for the revocation
of fourteen food additive regulations, issued an Order concerning
pesticides and commodities. 26 The petition had claimed that these
food additives violated the Delaney Clause. The Order confirmed the
EPA's commitment to the de minimis exception despite Public Citizen
v. Young.27
23 Id. at 1113-15.
2 Id. at 1113.
2 Gilhooley, supra note 17, at 297.
56 Fed. Reg. 7750 (1991).
27 The Order provided:
On the questions involving congressional rigidity and legislative design, EPA
undertook an exhaustive review of the FFCDA and pertinent legislative
histories. EPA discovered fewer signs of congressional rigidity in the FFDCA
and its legislative history concerning the food additives Delaney Clause than
were noted by the Public Citizen court regarding the color additives Delaney
Clause. [See supra note 21]. In fact, the legislative history of section 409
and other provisions involving pesticides actually suggest that a rigid in-
terpretation of the food additives Delaney Clause would be inconsistent
with congressional intent. This determination is confirmed by Congress'
legislative design for regulating pesticides. Hence, EPA concludes that the
food additives Delaney Clause is subject to an exception for pesticide uses
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In addition to undermining the Delaney Clause, the Dunkel Draft's
sanitary and phytosanitary provisions pose a potential threat to the
high standards of FIFRA. FIFRA was enacted in 1947 to provide
for the registration, inspection, and control of pesticides which might
be harmful either to the environment, humans, or animals. 28 FIFRA,
unlike the Delaney Clause, is not a zero-risk statute. Under section
136(1) of FIFRA, a pesticide presents an imminent hazard if it is
"likely to result in unreasonable adverse effects on the environment
or ... to the survival of a species declared endangered.' '29 According
to the language of the statute, a pesticide which has been scientifically
proven to be dangerous in some way will not automatically be banned,
but will be allowed to remain in use unless it presents some "imminent
hazard."30 FIFRA also provides for classification of pesticides ac-
cording to whether or not the product "may generally cause, without
additional regulatory restrictions, unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment . . . . 3
Unlike debate over the Delaney Clause, current debate over FIFRA
does not center around its textual interpretation. The issue here is
whether FIFRA and its implementation by the EPA pre-empt state
laws and municipal ordinances which enforce stricter standards than
those imposed by FIFRA. State supreme court and federal circuit
court cases were divided on the issue,32 but the U.S. Supreme Court
resolved the conflict in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier.3 3 The
which pose trivial risks.
Id. at 7755.
21 Under FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136(c), a pesticide is "adulterated" if "its strength
or purity falls below the professed standard of quality as expressed on its labeling
under which it is sold . .. ."
- 7 U.S.C. § 136(l)(1988) (emphasis added).
30 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d)(1). There is some debate as to what standard will be used
for re-registration of pesticides, which is required under § 136a. The "unreasonable
adverse effects" standard is considered by many to be too vague, as is the "imminent
hazard" standard. The major complaint is that discretionary risk and benefit stan-
dards such as these are subject to being manipulated and might result in delay in
removing dangerous pesticides from the market. For a full discussion of this issue,
see Marina M. Lolley, Carcinogen Roulette: The Game Played Under FIFRA, 49
MD. L. REv. 975 (1990).
11 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d)(1)(B)(1988) (emphasis added).
32 The principal cases in favor of preemption were Professional Lawn Care Ass'n
v. Milford, 909 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1990) and Maryland Pest Control Ass'n v.
Montgomery County, 822 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1987). Major decisions against pre-
emption came from two state supreme courts: Central Maine Power Co. v. Lebanon,
571 A.2d 1189 (Me. 1990) and People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino,
36 Cal.3d 476, 683 P.2d 1150, 204 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1984).
31 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991).
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Court held that no actual conflict exists between the local and federal
laws and that FIFRA does not pre-empt local governmental regulation
of pesticide use since it does not supersede local action either explicitly
or implicitly.3 4 The Court emphasized that local governments are
often better equipped to regulate pesticides to meet specific local
needs."
B. Current GA TT Standards Code
The GATT is a multilateral agreement designed to facilitate inter-
national trade and is negotiated through a series of "rounds," during
which representatives discuss rules. The substance of their discussion,
however, is bargaining for trade restrictions, concessions, and har-
monization.3 6 The bargaining results in a contract which will function
as a code of conduct between member nations who are referred to
as "contracting parties." The GATT's objective is to conduct trade
and other economic endeavors "with a view to raising standards of
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing
volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use
of the resources of the world and expanding the production and
exchange of goods . . . . " The resulting GATT system performs two
major functions: it serves as higher authority when there is internal
pressure for protectionist measures and as an international forum for
dispute resolution.3"
The original GATT did not include provisions on technical barriers
to trade. The Tokyo Round of negotiations took place between 1973
and 1979 and resulted in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, often referred to as the Standards Code. The Standards Code
prohibits signatories from adopting technical regulations or standards,
for the purpose of protecting consumer or environmental health or
safety, that create undue impediments to trade. 39 Although the Stan-
dards Code does not provide specific regulations, its objective is to
4 Id. at 2482.
1 Id. at 2484 (quoting S. REP. No. 970, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1972), reprinted
in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3983, 4111).
See J. Michael Finger, That Old GA TT Magic No More Casts Its Spell (How
the Uruguay Round Failed), 25 J. WORLD TRADE 19, 21 (1991).
37 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature October 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, All, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 194 [hereinafter GATT).
39 MacNabb & Weaver, supra note 1, at 761.
19 GATT: Technical Barriers to Trade, opened for signature April 12, 1979,
Preface, 31 U.S.T. 405, 1186 U.N.T.S. 276, reprinted in THE TEXTS OF THE TOKYO
ROUND AGREEMENTS (Geneva, 1986) [hereinafter Standards Codel.
[Vol. 22:233
URUGUAY ROUND OF GATT
ensure that newly imposed technical standards do not create unnec-
essary obstacles to tradeY°
Though most provisions of the GATT have been effective with
similar permissive, vague language, the Standards Code faces several
problems because of its openness. When arguments among contracting
parties arise as to whether one party's health regulations are necessary
or create obstacles to trade, the Code provides for dispute resolution
panels composed of technical experts. 4' There are no effective sanc-
tions, however, if the panel determines that the regulations are un-
necessary or create obstacles to trade. The most severe punishment
available is to authorize one party to suspend its GATT obligations
to another. 42 Another problem posed by the Standards Code is that
it does not cover requirements for processing and production methods
(PPMs), which include the use of pesticides. Parties need only draft
domestic PPM requirements in order to circumvent the Code alto-
gether and create as many obstacles to trade as they wish. 43
C. U.S.-EC Hormone Beef Dispute and the Need for the
Uruguay Round
The GATT and the Standards Code address three types of gov-
ernmental intervention which are barriers to imports: tariffs, quotas,
and subsidies." While some farm tariffs are tolerated by the GATT,
those which are severely trade distorting are discouraged. 4 Although
quotas may also distort competitive trade even more subtly than
tariffs, current GATT rules as applied to agriculture do not effectively
address these internal measures.4 Article XVI of the GATT defines
subsidies broadly so that almost any governmental action which results
in direct benefits may be considered a subsidy. 47 World market prices
are then distorted, and producers in importing countries are hurt
when subsidies allow exporters to lower prices so that they do not
reflect the natural forces of supply and demand. 41
40 Id. at Preface, para. 5.
41 Id. at arts. 14.9, 14.14.
42 Id. at art. 14.21.
41 Adrian Rafael Halpern, The U.S.-EC Hormone Beef Controversy and the
Standards Code: Implications for the Application of Health Regulations to Agri-
cultural Trade, 14 N.C. J. INT'L L. & Comm. REG. 135, 147-48 (1989).
4 MacNabb &-Weaver, supra note 1, at 769. See also, id. at 761-62 n.7.
41 Id. at 769.
46 Id.
41 Id. at 770.
48 Id.
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When these purposeful governmental barriers were effectively banned
by the Standards Code, contracting parties began to use health stan-
dards and regulations in the form of requirements for PPMs as covers
for protectionist measures. This enabled them to create effective
subsidies for their struggling independent farmers while avoiding con-
flict with the explicit terms of the GATT.49 One such purported health
regulation was the European Community's ban on all trade of beef
treated with growth hormones.50 Although the EC asserts the ban's
necessity to protect against possible health risks, the United States
contends that the ban is not based on scientific evidence and is
therefore an unjustified trade barrier.'
The Standards Code provides the following relevant obligations:
technical regulations and standards may not be prepared, adopted,
or applied "with a view to creating obstacles to international trade," 5 2
and certification systems must not discriminate against or among
imports.53 Although the Code does not cover standards drafted in
terms of PPMs, it does provide that a dispute settlement case may
be brought where a contracting party has used PPMs in order to
circumvent the Code's obligations.5 4 The U.S.-EC dispute illustrates
the failure of the GATT and the Code to resolve disagreement over
how such standards and policies are to be coordinated in order to
facilitate trade. 55
It also illustrates the inadequacy of the Code's dispute resolution
mechanism in giving the non-regulating party the burden of proving
a negative. 56 When the regulating party claims that its standards are
necessary to protect human health, the non-regulating party must
conclusively show that the restricted product is absolutely safe.57 But
an exporting country can rarely, if ever, prove absolute safety,58 as
49 See, e.g., Halpern, supra note 43, at 144 (explaining the EC directive against
beef treated with growth hormone).
10 Council Directive 85/649, arts. 5, 6(1), 1985 O.J. (L 382) 228, 229-30.
51 Halpern, supra note 43, at 135.
12 Standards Code, supra note 39, at art. 2.1.
13 Id. at art. 7.2.
14 Id. at art. 14.25.
15 Michael B. Froman, Recent Development, 30 HARv. INT'L L.J. 549 (1989).
16 See Steven J. Rothberg, Note, From Beer to BST: Circumventing the GATT
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exemplified by the U.S. domestic problems concerning the Delaney
Clause and FIFRA.59
III. ANALYsIs
A. Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures in the Dunkel
Draft
The Uruguay Round negotiations attempted to respond to the
problems resulting from the omissions of the Tokyo Round by adding
a Decision on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (Decision). 60 The
purpose of the Decision is to reaffirm that the GATT allows con-
tracting parties to adopt or enforce valid measures designed to protect
human, animal, or plant life or health, but continues to prohibit
such measures which are merely a means of discrimination or re-
striction on international trade. 61 Contracting parties thus have the
right to take SPS measures, but also have the obligation to ensure
that they are applied only to the extent necessary to provide protection
based on scientific evidence. 62 The Decision is drafted very differently
from the previous GATT texts in that it attempts to set up stan-
dardized rules and regulations towards the goal of harmonization and
transparency. 6 The Administration section of the Decision promises
that a Committee on SPS Measures will be established to provide a
forum for consultations, facilitate negotiations, encourage the use of
international standards, and monitor the process of international
harmonization. 4
Parties may have higher standards than those of the international
organizations if they are scientifically justified or if a need exists for
provision of an appropriate level of SPS protection, provided they
are not inconsistent with any other GATT provisions and obligations. 61
19 See supra part II.A.
60 Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, at L.35, pt. C.
61 Id. at L.35.
61 Id. at L.36, paras. 6, 7.
61 "To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as
possible, contracting parties shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on
international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist, except as
otherwise provided for in this decision." Id. at L.37, para. 9. "Contracting parties
shall notify changes in their sanitary or phytosanitary measures and shall provide
information on their sanitary or phytosanitary measures ... " Id. at L.40, para.
27.
, Id. at L.42, paras. 38-41.
61 Id. at L.37, para. 11.
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In assessing the appropriate level of protection against SPS risks,
parties must consider scientific evidence, PPMs, and relevant eco-
logical and environmental conditions, while also taking into account
the ultimate objective of minimizing negative trade effects. 66
The Dunkel Draft makes few improvements in the dispute settlement
techniques of the GATT. The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII
of the GATT apply to the SPS decision with the addition that the
dispute panel may, when appropriate, seek advice from experts or
establish an advisory technical experts group. 67 Contracting parties
are responsible for implementing the obligations set out in an SPS
decision, including taking "such reasonable measures as may be
available to them to ensure that non-governmental entities within their
territories, as well as regional bodies in which relevant entities within
their territories are members, comply with the relevant provisions of
this decision." 68
B. Interaction Between FIFRA, FFDCA, and the Uruguay Round
Draft, and Implications for U.S. Acceptance
In formulating its response to the SPS measures of the draft, the
United States must consider not only how rejection would impact
U.S. participation in world trade, but also how acceptance would
affect domestic health, safety, and environmental laws. Consumer
and public interest groups have expressed opposition to this portion
of the draft agreement, contending that adherence to the international
standards proposed in the draft would require the United States to
lower its standards. In order to compete and trade freely in the world
market, they say, the United States would have to allow imports or
exports which fail to meet United States standards, thus possibly
increasing danger to human, animal, and environmental health. This
perception is premised upon a misunderstanding of both the current
status of FIFRA and the Delaney Clause of the FFDCA and reflects
a restrictive reading of the Dunkel Draft.
Contrary to consumer opinion and that of groups such as the
Community Nutrition Institute which oppose the Dunkel Draft, 69 the
Delaney Clause does not create a zero-risk standard in most circum-
16 Id. at L.38, paras. 17, 19.
67 Id. at L.41, paras. 35, 36.
68 Id. at L.43, para. 45.
69 GA TT Language, supra note 3, at 62.
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stances. 70 Likewise, FIFRA only prohibits pesticides which are likely
to result in unreasonable adverse effects,7' implying that minimal
adverse effects would be allowed. Both rules, therefore, are based
upon scientific standards, yet are flexible enough to account for de
minimis amounts of carcinogenic substances or negligibly adulterated
products.
Although the Dunkel Draft was designed to establish international
SPS standards, the rules set forth in the document itself are not
firmly entrenched. The draft is a working document to be used as
a means of facilitating further negotiations which had been stalled. 72
Contracting parties must work together along with the proposed
Committee on SPS Measures to harmonize standards in order to
ensure protection of human and environmental health as well as to
facilitate trade. The draft specifically gives contracting parties the
right to introduce measures which result in a higher level of protection,
so long as they do not interfere with other provisions of the GATT.
Evaluation of the impact the Dunkel Draft's acceptance might have
on domestic law requires an understanding of the position of the
GATT in U.S. domestic law. The GATT has never been ratified by
Congress as a treaty, so it lacks treaty authority for purposes of
domestic litigation. 71 GATT is generally considered to be an executive
agreement which has legal status equivalent to treaties and may
supersede inconsistent state law. 74 However unlikely, full acceptance
70 See supra part II.A. (discussing the domestic application of the FFDCA Delaney
Clause and FIFRA).
7- 7 U.S.C. § 136(J)(1988).
12 The Dunkel Draft provides:
This document is being tabled by the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations
Committee at Official Level with the following understanding: . . . (c) Final
agreement on the attached Draft Final Act will depend on substantial and
meaningful results for all parties being achieved in the ongoing market
access negotiations, including those related to tariffs and non-tariff meas-
ures: this applies to areas such as natural resource-based products, tropical
products, agriculture and textiles and clothing.
Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, at Preface.
73 Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
in United States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479, 490 (1990) (citing Sneaker
Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 457 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d
1290 (2d Cir. 1979)).
74 Id. at 501-02. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952), Justice Jackson's concurring opinion introduced a three part analysis of the
ways in which executive authority comports with congressional authority. 343 U.S.
at 635-38. GATT agreements seem to fall in the "zone of twilight" where the
Executive is not acting with the authorization of Congress, but is acting with its
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of the current Dunkel Draft by the U.S. Trade Representative acting
for the Executive Branch would incorporate the draft into the GATT
once the other GATT members accept it. Upon incorporation, the
draft would be elevated to executive agreement status, effectively
superseding inconsistent state law. This would mean that state laws
which comply with or supplement FIFRA and FFDCA might be
superseded by inconsistent standards and procedures mandated by
the Dunkel Draft's SPS measures.
The Dunkel Draft does, however, allow for the introduction of
measures which would result in a higher level of SPS protection if
they are scientifically justified, consistent with other provisions of
the GATT, and not disguised protectionist measures. 75 FIFRA and
Delaney Clause decisions are not always based strictly on scientific
considerations, especially when agencies use a de minimis standard
for product regulation. 76 Factors such as consumer perception and
environmental health are also often taken into account. In this case,
the United States and its internal regulatory bodies might not be able
to scientifically explain domestic SPS regulations. 77 Finally, although
the draft seems to introduce strict measures for immediate harmo-
nization of SPS standards, problems such as the hormone beef dispute
might still arise without any means of resolution. The draft merely
proposes that the standards of international organizations such as
the International Office of Epizootics would be adopted as standards
for international trade, leaving room for negotiation among con-
tracting parties and gradual harmonization of standards. 78
The draft fails to provide much improvement, however, in the area
of dispute resolution. If the proposals of the draft are accepted,
contracting parties might continue to get caught in patterns (such as
implied acquiescence. More than forty years of active participation in the GATT
has led to a continuing practice which has been silently allowed by Congress. The
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §2903(a)(1) (1988),
however, contains language implying full legal status for the GATT, which would
allow it to supersede domestic law. For a detailed discussion, see Brand, supra note
73, at 501.
15 Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, at L.37, para. 11.
76 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
11 Ironically, this situation is the reverse of the United States' position in the
hormone beef dispute, in which the United States insisted that there was no scientific
reason to doubt the safety of the hormone, while the EC argued that public perception
was an important consideration, as was the welfare of its small, independent farmers.
See, Halpern, supra note 43, at 151.
71 Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, at L.42, paras. 40-41.
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the United States-EC dispute) which look to the GATT for guidance,
but find only a means for further disagreement. 79 The draft proposes
appointing a permanent committee to settle such disputes. But if a
party, relying on Article XX of the GATT, argues that its regulations
are unsuitable for scientific examinations, such a committee has no
useful function.80 The need for continuing negotiation remains even
after acceptance of the draft agreement, during which the United
States will not be required to lower its standards, but rather to
advocate those standards as ones which should become international.
IV. CONCLUSION
With respect to sanitary and phytosanitary measures, the goal of
the Uruguay Round negotiations was to develop international stan-
dards for health regulations in order to facilitate open trade without
the protectionist use of domestic health standards as technical barriers
to trade. The major problem with such a goal is that it requires
agreement as to what constitutes an acceptable risk for harmful effects
of pesticides, hormones, and other chemicals which come into contact
with food, other processed products for human consumption, and
the environment.
Attempting to reach such an agreement forced the delegates at the
Uruguay Round to deal with some difficult issues.8 First, who should
determine the appropriate levels of safety for different nations? Few
nations will be willing to accept standards which are lower than their
own and to subject their own legislation to the concerns of their
trading partners. Second, does the "escape clause" of Article XX(b)
19 In the hormone beef dispute, the United States argued that a panel of experts
be allowed to determine the scientific basis of the health risk posed and thus resolve
the dispute as recommended by the terms of the Standards Code. The EC rejected
that proposal, contending that the issue was less scientific than social, perhaps relying
on Article XX(b). See discussion infra note 80.
11 Article XX provides general exceptions to the GATT as a whole (an "escape
clause") and reads:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised re-
striction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of meas-
ures: . . . (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.
GATT, supra note 37, at art. XX(b). The Dunkel Draft SPS Decision specifically
includes as one of its goals the expansion of Article XX(b). Dunkel Draft, supra
note 4, at L.36.
sI Halpern, supra note 43, at 150-51.
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extend to popular concern and the psychological health of consumers?
While the negotiations appeared to focus on scientific support for
regulating health risks, this escape clause focuses on subjective de-
terminations which are more responsive to the needs of a particular
area or state.
Another problem with the Uruguay Round and its resulting draft
agreement is that they fail to recognize the importance of health and
safety matters to individual nations. Health and safety concerns tend
to be given the same degree of state interest as national security. The
Uruguay Round has underestimated the effect this could have on
reaching a final agreement by neglecting to devote much energy to
minimizing the disadvantages to free trade caused by differing stan-
dards."s Another complicating factor is that different countries have
widely varying positions on health and safety, which result in unique
priorities. Lesser developed countries, for example, have a different
perspective from the United States, which in turn has a different
perspective from the European Community. To disregard one interest
in the hopes of bolstering another would only result in impediments
to trade which appear to be protectionist, but which would in the
end harm the interested country. Many dangerous pesticides, for
example, are banned in the United States because there is no food
supply problem and the agricultural industry can afford to regulate
on the basis of health. In Third World countries, however, these
same pesticides are widely used because of the economic importance
of their agricultural industries .13 When Third World countries then
export these products, the pesticides banned in the United States end
up in products consumed in the United States despite stringent do-
mestic regulation."
The question finally becomes one of choosing between facilitating
international trade and enforcing strict guidelines for the protection
of human, animal, and environmental health. The goal of the Uruguay
Round negotiations seems doomed to failure because it attempts to
choose both at the same time, in fact trying to improve international
trade by enforcing strict health regulations. A more realistic and
82 Eliza Patterson, International Efforts to Minimize the Adverse Trade Effects
of National Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 91, 95
(1990).
83 In fact, they are often imported from the United States under FIFRA, 7 U.S.C.
§136(o)(1988), which authorizes the export of pesticides that do not meet U.S.
standards.
"Halpern, supra note 43, at 153.
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responsive approach would be to work towards balancing the two
objectives. Contracting parties should be allowed to advance their
own health interests through domestic regulation such as FIFRA and
the Delaney Clause, but not so that international trade is completely
unrestricted. The goal should be to allow for regulation which is
narrowly constructed so as to impede the free flow of trade as little
as possible.
Beth Sanders

